I want to take my eyes off the train wreck that is the current US Administration under Donald Trump, and review the history that has led to the current situation in Ukraine. I anticipate that Trump might well deliver a fatal stab in the Ukrainian back. Before that happens, let’s take a look at how we got here.

The relevant history really starts with the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT Talks) in the 1970’s. In 1982 Ronald Regan changed the focus of nuclear arms discussion from limitations to reduction, and the discussions became the Strategic Arms Reduction Talks (START). The talks were extremely successful. Subsequent to the signing of the START1 treaty in July 1991, and the eventual implementation of those agreements starting in 1994, ~80% of the world’s nuclear warheads were destroyed. (Sadly, that still leaves more than enough to destroy civilization if they are ever all deployed, but 80% was a damn good start.)

But while the START talks were proceeding, historic things were happening. Things like the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989, and the subsequent breakup of the Soviet Union in December 1991. So here you sit with a ground-breaking agreement negotiated with a political entity, but then that political entity almost immediately ceases to exist. Dang!

The Soviet Union and the United States of America didn’t like each other, but they had a lot of common understanding. The strategies of Mutually Assured Destruction, and the principles of first strike policy were well understood inside the Kremlin. Remember that the Soviets had been talking about elimination of nuclear weapons for almost ten years and some thorny issues had been resolved. Remember as well that the Americans were familiar with the leadership of the Soviet Union. They were much less familiar with, and less comfortable with, the leadership of Ukraine and the other new nuclear states. So, while one is tempted today to decry the removal of Ukraine’s nuclear arsenal, in the context of the START talks and the breakdown of the Soviet Union, it was really the only safe and practical resolution. And the US, pursuant to the nuclear non-proliferation treaty, insisted on the disarming of Ukraine. We’re told that “Ukrainian politicians were not entirely united by the idea. Some felt that Russia was a still a threat and that they should keep the weapons as a deterrent”.

Ukraine presented a long list of preconditions for their agreement to become officially a “non-nuclear” state. The preconditions required security assurances from Russia and the United States, foreign aid for dismantlement, and compensation for the nuclear material. Ukraine’s disarmament was a deal and like every deal there were pro’s and con’s. The pro’s were first that agreeing to disarmament was a signal of responsibility and a readiness to be accepted into the brotherhood of European nations and second, there were significant financial incentives offered as compensation, including money for the financial value of tons of enriched uranium.

But what about those security assurances? Well, that’s where the con’s come in. “Ukraine’s leaders pushed hard to obtain robust and legally-binding security guarantees from the United States. But the United States, wary of undertaking any new security commitments, was unwilling to provide them. In the end, the negotiators found a politically acceptable compromise by crafting assurances that reiterated pledges to respect Ukraine’s territorial integrity and inviolability of its borders.” Those assurances were agreed to by the United States and the United Kingdom, and also, importantly, by Russia. In 1996 the last warhead was removed from Ukrainian control.

Assurances “to respect borders” proved singularly useless when Russia invaded Ukraine, capturing and annexing the Crimean peninsula in March 2014 under a pretext of protecting Russian speaking citizens in the region. “The United States and the United Kingdom fulfilled the letter of the Memorandum by immediately bringing the issue of the Russian violation before the UN Security Council.” Yay! The UN!

I imagine that fell just a tad short of what Ukraine had in mind for security assurances. Invasion prompted speeches in the United Nations assembly – I can’t imagine a more useless response. But sadly, it turns out that “the letter of the memorandum did not specify consequences for violating it or obligate the United States or the United Kingdom to come to Ukraine’s defense.”

Why didn’t the US respond more vigorously? That goes back to that statement that when they were asked for security assurances, the US was “wary of taking on any new security commitments”. The United States lost 58220 soldiers in the Vietnam war. In a dozen engagements (Iraq, Afghanistan, Kosovo and more) since the end of the Vietnam war, they’ve suffered another 7700 fatalities.

I think the simple truth is that the American public is sick of wars. And America’s leaders are aware of that sentiment. After Barack Obama failed to respond to Assad’s use of chemical weapons in Syria in 2013, he is quoted as saying “the United States should not be the world’s policeman”. And he is not alone in that feeling. George W Bush (aka The Dub), Clinton, Trump (45) and Biden have all publicly expressed the same sentiment.

In the view of Adam Karatnycky, the author of reference 3, George W Bush responded very weakly to Russia’s international assassinations and to their invasion of Georgia in 2008. Harsh sanctions early in the game might have caused Putin to pull in his horns. But that didn’t happen, which led to the invasion of Crimea.

Obama’s response to the Crimean invasion was equally weak. From the outset, the Obama administration did as little as possible to antagonize Russia. Obama scrapped plans for a missile defense shield in Eastern Europe. He staunchly opposed sending arms to Ukraine after the invasion of Crimea and the Donbas territory. The response to the Russian aggression was a weak set of economic sanctions, and Obama refused to lead negotiations to end the incursion, saying that it ought to be a European responsibility.

The strategy behind Obama’s position is explained as a logical outcome of “escalatory dominance theory”. Briefly, the theory is that if you recognize that Russia is more interested and committed to dominating Ukraine than the US is in helping them, you’ll only make things worse by escalating things, because the Russians will always escalate more than you will. Because of that theory, the US refused arms to Ukraine. A well-equipped Ukraine military might have prevented the full-scale invasion in 2022, but because of Obama’s timid approach, that was never achieved.

In 2016 the orange idiot came to power in the US. He essentially followed the Obama program of weak support for Ukraine, but inserted his own brand of bizarre chaos that made it impossible to say clearly what the US policy really was. Unlike his predecessor, Trump consistently refused even to acknowledge the Russian government’s responsibility for the occupation of Crimea. Instead, he typically blamed Obama.

Foreign policy analysts were repeatedly confounded by the incoherence of Trump’s White House. Administration officials would articulate a policy, and Trump would open his big mouth and contradict the official policy. And then some spokesman would have to try to walk it back or make some sense of it. For example, after he became President (and while official US policy was that they would “hold Russia accountable for its actions in Crimea”) he commented at a 2018 G7 summit in Charlevoix, Quebec, that “Crimea is Russian because everyone who lives there speaks Russian.”

Eventually, under pressure from within his administration, Trump reluctantly agreed to the provision of some military supplies to Ukraine, including Javelin anti-tank missiles. But then came the infamous “quid pro quo” demand from Trump to have Zelensky initiate an investigation into the activities of Hunter Biden. When that demand was refused, Trump suspended some $400M in military aid saying “Ukraine tried to take me down. I’m not f***ing interested in helping them”. This refusal to spend Congressionally mandated funds brought on his first impeachment.

Ruth Deyermond (Reference 4) recounts that Trump’s foreign policy was characterized by his “personal obsession with winning and gaining respect” and by Trump’s ‘quick temper, short attention span and poor impulse control.” In polite terms, he was described as having “low conceptual complexity” (too friggin’ dumb to get it) and lacking “the attention span to handle the day to day rigours of the presidency”. In less polite terms, he was described by a trio of his most senior advisors (Secretary of Defence, Secretary of State and National Security Advisor) as a moron, a dope, and an idiot with the intelligence of a kindergartner.

Dr. Deyermond, a senior political science lecturer on Post-Soviet Security at King’s College, London, goes past these personal weaknesses however, and suggests that Trump’s actions may have been driven by his personal self-interest.

“It has also been widely suggested, however, that Trump’s private
interests significantly influenced his approach to Russia. One example of this is the suggestion of a link between Trump’s opposition to sanctions against Russia during his campaign period and his plans to build a Trump Tower project in Moscow. A second is the speculation about the impact of Trump’s possible debts to Russian individuals with connections to the Russian intelligence services.

Official records of conversations between Trump and Russian officials, including Putin, frequently included only the most minimal summary of issues discussed, with little or no detail on the position taken on the issues by Trump. In some cases this lack of detail appears to be a result of Trump’s decision to meet without officials, or to suppress the official record of meetings. In at least two cases of meetings between Trump and Putin, no US officials were present at all. Following another meeting, Trump reportedly confiscated the US translator’s notes; as a result, no White House memorandum of the meeting was made available to other administration members or retained for official records. Beyond the potential influence of his business interests, there is persistent speculation about the possibility that Russian government possession of ‘kompromat’ [compromising information] on Trump shaped his policy towards Russia”

Regardless of the reasons behind US policy making under Trump, the net effect of the President’s efforts was consistently pro-Russian. “On every issue, Trump took a significantly more conciliatory position with Russia than that to which his administration was committed: he avoided having to acknowledge Putin’s responsibility for the annexation of Crimea; talked up the material benefits of that annexation; sought to withhold military aid to Ukraine; may have intended to lift sanctions; and pushed to have Russia readmitted to the G7/8.” Although these attempts to advance Russia’s cause were ultimately unsuccessful, there is little doubt that they encouraged and emboldened Vladimir Putin.

When Biden succeeded Trump in 2021, Putin was in the process of preparing for the full-scale invasion. Although Biden was more supportive than his predecessors, military support was offered in dribs and drabs. Not until Russia was massing near the Ukraine border in December 2021 did Biden offer things like shoulder-fired anti-tank missiles. But no howitzers. And after the invasion, decisions to increase the lethality of weapons for Ukraine were always dragged out and delayed. Thousands of Ukraine soldiers died before the US wagered to provide thinks like fighter jets and patriot missiles. Under Biden, support was mostly verbal. Practical, useful military support was mostly too little, too late.

Two factors seem to have driven US response. First is the fear of escalation and second is the related fear of being drawn into another foreign war. But none of this should be seen as short-term, and it’s not all about Trump. George W Bush, the supposed tough guy, failed to stand up to Putin. Obama, the president whom I’ve hitherto really admired, displayed all the spine of Neville Chamberlain. Trump in his first term failed to stab Ukraine in the back only because he was restrained by others in his administration and by other world leaders. Biden, buoyed by rising pro-Ukraine sentiment following the invasion, was able to do more, but was still notably restrained in his responses.

There was time after the collapse of the Soviet Union and before Putin’s power became unchallengeable. Remember that Russia went through Boris Yeltsin and an attempt at capitalism and democracy before Putin became President in March 2000. Even after Putin gained the Presidency, there were years of consolidating power and eliminating opposition in Russia. During those years, why didn’t Ukraine act more strongly to prepare itself for that moment when the Russian bear woke up hungry? Why didn’t the US, why didn’t NATO countries in Europe, arm Ukraine during that period?

The answer is that while we are all seeing Ukraine through post-invasion glasses, it wasn’t always thus. Like Russia, Ukraine went through a series of corrupt governments and descended into being a kleptocracy. It was struggling with becoming a solid respectable “rule of law” country, not with countering Russian expansionism. In 2008, the EU entered into discussions with Ukraine about developing closer political and trading ties with Europe. But, in that same year, NATO considered offering a Membership Action Plan (MAP), and then failed to do so when Putin objected strenuously against western expansion into what he perceives as Russia’s legitimate zone of influence. That was the same year that Putin’s forces invaded Georgia. It was too late. Putin was already entrenched and flexing his muscles. And the policy of appeasement, the policy to avoid escalatory responses, was apparently already entrenched.

So what do we learn from this history lesson?

First of all, we should take Obama’s message seriously. America no longer wants to be the policeman for the world and who can blame them? Now, I’m not naïve enough to believe that the US has been the world’s policeman out of the goodness of their hearts. Most American wars have been good for business. But whatever you may think of how the Americans (and the rest of the OECD) profited from the last 75 years, it appears that the “pax Americana” is coming to a close. We can no longer count on America to protect us.

As disgusting as it might be to accept this reality, Trump is right in one respect. We haven’t been meeting our NATO spending target, and we’re not even close. We’ve been covered by the nuclear deterrence threat of Big Brother USA, and by the conventional superiority of US armed forces coupled with their determination to maintain order in the world.

We should accept that that’s gone now. It’s time for Canada to stand on our own. Since I started writing stuff 3 years ago, I’ve become a bit of a hawk on the need to increase our defence capabilities. The research for this article only confirms that feeling. Don’t count on things being better after Trump is gone. The American urge to withdraw and isolate themselves is 20 years old and maturing nicely. We must not ever again count too highly on the USA, lest we find ourselves in Ukraine’s position.

Second, it’s going to cost us money, people. Don’t complain when taxes go up to cover an improved military.

Third, I wrote some months ago that we should simplify our military procurement process by buying standard NATO stuff. To a great extent that would be buying American stuff, like the F35. Given an American trade war, and even the possibility of an America that is seeking to embrace Putin’s Russia, perhaps we should focus more on alliances with – and armaments from – our European partners.

Let me know what you think about our need for improved defence capability.

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References

1. Arms Control Association, “Ukraine, Nuclear Weapons, and Security Assurances at a Glance” Dec 2020
2. Harvard Kennedy School, Belfer Centre for Science and International Studies – March 2020, Mariana Budjeryn, Budapst Memorandum at 25: Between Past and Future.
3. Foreignpolicy.com – The Long, Destructive Shadow of Obama’s Russia Doctrine July 2023
4. RUTH DEYERMOND, International Affairs journal, 3 July 2023 – The Trump presidency, Russia and Ukraine: explaining incoherence